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Abstract 
The potential of blockchain has been extensively discussed in practitioner literature, yet rigorous 
empirical and theory-driven information systems (IS) research on blockchain remains scarce. This 
special issue addresses the need for innovative research that offers a fresh look at the opportunities 
and challenges of blockchain. This editorial integrates and goes beyond the papers included in this 
special issue by providing a framework for blockchain research in IS that emphasizes two important 
issues: First, we direct the attention of IS research toward the blockchain protocol level, which is 
characterized by recursive interactions between human agents and the blockchain protocol. Second, 
we highlight the need for IS research to consider how the protocol level constrains and affords 
blockchain applications, and how these constraints and other concerns at the application level lead 
to changes at the protocol level. Rooted in a socio-material view of IS, we offer a multiparadigmatic 
IS research agenda that underscores the need for behavioral (individual, group, and organizational), 
design science, and IS economics research on blockchain. Our research agenda emphasizes issues of 
blockchain governance, human and material agency, blockchain affordances and constraints, as well 
as the consequences of its use. 
Keywords: Blockchain, Distributed Ledger Technology, Behavioral, Design Science, Economics 
of IS, Research Agenda. 
1 Introduction 
A blockchain is an append-only distributed database 
of transactions, characterized by high tamper-
resistance, despite the lack of defined central operator. 
Blockchains are believed to fundamentally transform 
our economies and societies—in particular, by 
lowering transaction costs and reducing the need for 
trusted third parties (Catalini & Gans, 2016; Clemons, 
Dewan, Kauffman, & Weber, 2017; Iansiti & Lakhani, 
2017).  
Blockchain’s potential to transform markets and 
societies has motivated public and private 
organizations to make deep investments. Investors 
have backed blockchain-enabled cryptocurrencies 
such as Bitcoin, which have attracted substantial 
interest in financial markets (Mai, Shan, Bai, Wang, 
& Chiang, 2018) and mixed assessments from 
regulators (Guo & Liang, 2016). More ambitious 
applications have also been proposed, most of which 
rely on blockchain-based smart contracts—i.e., 
algorithms stored on the blockchain, meaning that 
their execution is de facto guaranteed (Buterin, 2014). 
Recently, a joint venture between Maersk and IBM 
was announced that aims to substantially increase the 
efficiency and security of moving products across the 
globe (Nærland, Müller-Bloch, Beck, & Palmund, 
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2017). Collectively, important actors agree that 
blockchain could impact many aspects of our societies 
from environmental sustainability (Chapron, 2017) to 
healthcare (Gammon, 2018) and social networks 
(Ciriello, Beck, & Thatcher, 2018).  
While organizations have invested in exploring 
blockchain’s potential, information systems (IS) 
research investigating blockchain remains scarce. 
Some early work has offered insight into how to 
design applications based on blockchain-based smart 
contracts (e.g., Egelund-Müller, Elsman, Henglein, & 
Ross, 2017). Other work has examined the use of 
cryptocurrencies in practice. For example, Li and 
Wang (2017) conducted an empirical study on the 
determinants of cryptocurrency exchange rates in the 
case of Bitcoin.  
Despite such exceptions, scant work in IS contributes 
to forming a theory-driven or rigorous empirically 
derived understanding of blockchain and its 
implications (Beck, Avital, Rossi, & Thatcher, 2017). 
This special issue jump-starts the scholarly 
conversation about blockchain in two important and 
meaningful ways: first, by presenting cutting-edge IS 
research addressing this gap and, second, by 
employing this editorial to set an agenda for future IS 
research studying the opportunities and challenges of 
blockchain. This special issue emphasizes inclusivity 
by considering three major paradigms in IS research 
(behavioral, design, and economics), both in terms of 
the three papers included in the special issue and with 
respect to the research directions provided in this 
editorial. We will now provide an overview of the 
three papers in the special issue and subsequently 
present our own thoughts and suggestions for 
blockchain research in the IS community.  
To begin with, in “Self-Organising in Blockchain 
Infrastructures: Generativity Through Shifting 
Objectives and Forking,” Andersen and Ingram 
Bogusz develop the idea of self-organizing 
infrastructures. This is achieved through a 
longitudinal case study of forking within the Bitcoin 
blockchain infrastructure. The case reveals how 
diverging objectives of different implementer groups 
lead to forks that can result in incompatible 
subversions of the infrastructure. These are 
interpreted as manifestations of self-organizing within 
the growing community. The main theoretical 
contribution here is the description of different 
patterns of self-organizing within the Bitcoin 
community and their connection to development 
events. 
In the second paper, “Privacy-Preserving Data 
Certification in the Internet of Things: Leveraging 
Blockchain Technology to Protect Sensor Data,” 
Chanson, Bogner, Bilgeri, Fleisch, and Wortmann 
follow a design science research methodology to 
develop a blockchain solution for Internet-of-things 
(IoT) systems in the context of used cars. The paper 
deals with the problem of insecure communications 
and data storage in IoT devices by iteratively 
designing a blockchain-based system for protecting 
IoT sensor data. The design principles derived are 
evaluated with experts in an ex post evaluation step 
and then reported as an initial design theory for 
protecting IoT sensor data generation and processing. 
This paper combines a novel design, design 
theorizing, and practical implications, which is rare in 
one design science research paper. 
Finally, in “Business on Chain: A Comparative Case 
Study of Five Blockchain-Inspired Business Models,” 
Hua, Chong, Lim, Zheng, and Tan examine how firms 
leverage blockchain to create and capture value in 
novel ways. Through an exploratory comparative, 
multiple case-study approach, the authors analyzed 
the experience of five companies in mainland China 
that rolled out blockchain initiatives. From these case 
analyses, they derived a typology of five blockchain-
inspired business models (platformer, 
disintermediator, mediator, transformer, and co-
innovator), each of which embodies distinctive logics 
for market differentiation. In doing so, they offer 
insights into each model’s value creation logic, its 
value capturing mechanism, and the challenges that 
could threaten its longer-term viability. 
This editorial is structured as follows. In Section 2, we 
articulate our key concerns about blockchain research 
in the IS field and introduce a framework that directs 
the IS discipline’s attention beyond blockchain’s 
applications toward understanding the blockchain 
protocol level and its interactions with blockchain 
applications. In Section 3, we discuss critical issues at 
the blockchain protocol level and their interactions 
with blockchain applications, both of which we deem 
important for future IS research on blockchain. In 
Section 4, we use the framework to provide a forward-
looking research agenda that connects blockchain to 
three major paradigms of IS research: behavioral 
(individual, group, and organizational), design, and 
economics. Section 5 concludes.  
2 A Framework for Blockchain 
Research in Information Systems 
Recent work in top IS journals has emphasized 
blockchain’s potential to transform organizations and 
economies. Beck, Müller-Bloch, and King (2018) 
explore how blockchain may spark new forms of 
governance and organizations, while Clemons et al. 
(2017) articulate how blockchain may lead to broader 
economic changes. Others focus on blockchain’s 
ramifications for specific firm competencies such as 
business process management (Mendling et al., 2018) 
or accounting (Dai & Vasarhelyi, 2017), or specific 
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industries such as Fintech (Gomber, Kauffman, 
Parker, & Weber, 2018) or e-government (Ølnes, 
Ubacht, & Janssen, 2017). All of these papers 
emphasize different facets of blockchain research in 
IS. Most of these articles direct attention to blockchain 
as a tool or application to solve business or societal 
problems.  
While studying applications is consistent with the IS 
tradition, we believe our discipline needs to go beyond 
examining specific blockchain applications and 
toward understanding the broader implications of 
blockchain protocols. We do so, since not only extant 
work on blockchain in leading IS journals, but also the 
majority of the 37 special issue submissions focus on 
applications of blockchain to business problems. 
While such research is important, extending our 
field’s focus to examining the blockchain protocol 
level as well as its interactions with the blockchain 
application level is critical for IS research to 
contribute to a more refined understanding of the 
socio-materiality of blockchain.  
The key artifact of the blockchain protocol level is the 
blockchain protocol. It defines the technical rules 
under which the blockchain is produced. Table 1 
shows that these rules, in particular, pertain to human 
agents’ rights to validate transactions (as defined in 
the consensus protocol) and to read and submit 
transactions (Peters & Panayi, 2016). For instance, 
Bitcoin’s blockchain protocol excludes human agents1 
neither from validating transactions nor from reading 
and submitting transactions. Therefore, it would be 
classified as permissionless and public, according to 
Table 1. The blockchain protocol also incorporates 
additional rules, such as the existence and extent of 
transaction fees and the maximum number of 
transactions the blockchain can handle within a given 
time. However, at the blockchain protocol level, we 
find more than just “mere” technology in the form of 
the actual blockchain protocol—indeed, it is 
characterized by recursive interactions between 
human agents and the blockchain protocol. 
Blockchain protocols not only result from extensive 
negotiations over design choices between human 
agents, they also require constant affirmation and 
renegotiation of the agents over these rules, and 
changes to the protocol may follow. Moreover, human 
agents can undermine the blockchain protocol. At the 
same time, the blockchain protocol exerts material 
agency.2 It directly governs the interactions of human 
agents by mediating their competition, cooperation, 
conflicts, and conflict resolution. Human agents 
govern the blockchain protocol, and the blockchain 
protocol governs their interactions. Therefore, 
blockchain directs attention not only to governance of 
information technology, but also to governance 
through information technology. The blockchain 
protocol is imbricated with the human agents’ social 
world. This means that both are simultaneously 
interdependent, yet maintain their distinct irreducible 
character (Leonardi, 2011; Sassen, 2006). Over time, 
the interweaving of human agency and material 
agency (i.e., the blockchain protocol) may become 
taken for granted (“black-boxed”) and, therefore, 
infrastructure, or more specifically, blockchain 
infrastructure may be taken for granted as well (Star 
& Ruhleder, 1996; see also Andersen and Ingram 
Bogusz in this special issue). 
Besides the protocol level itself, there are critical 
interactions between the protocol level and the 
application level, given that the protocol level exerts 
affordances and constraints on applications and that 
actions at the protocol level are shaped by concerns 
about applicability and other developments at the 
application level. In this context, salient concerns 
include privacy, scalability, security, and 
environmental sustainability (we elaborate on these 
issues and their relevance for IS research in Section 3 
of this editorial). Both the protocol level itself and its 
interactions with blockchain applications therefore 
merit special attention from an IS perspective. Our 
proposed framework for IS research on blockchain 
integrates the above thoughts and ideas and guides our 
directions for future research (see Figure 1). We 
elaborate in the next two subsections and then 
conclude in the third subsection by addressing the 
state of IS research on blockchain applications.
 
1 In this paper, we use the terms “human agent” and “agent” 
interchangeably. Whenever we refer to material agents, we 
explicitly state it. 
2 Leonardi (2011) defines material agency as “the capacity 
for nonhuman entities to act on their own, apart from 
human intervention.” 
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Table 1. Key Dimensions of the Blockchain Protocol 
 
Access to transaction validation 
Access to transactions Permissioned Permissionless 
Public All agents can read and submit 
transactions. Only authorized 
agents can validate transactions. 
All agents can read, submit, and 
validate transactions. 
Private Only authorized agents can read, 
submit, and validate transactions. 
Not applicable 
 
 
2.1 The Blockchain Protocol Level 
First, studying the protocol level represents fertile 
ground for important IS research since, at the protocol 
level, human agents interact within the rules set by the 
blockchain protocol, while at the same time 
negotiating these rules via the blockchain protocol. A 
discussion of consensus protocols, perhaps the most 
salient aspect of blockchain protocols, reveals how the 
protocol level is socio-material: Given that 
blockchains function without a defined central 
operator, there is a need to avoid disagreement about 
what information is stored on the blockchain. A lack 
of consensus would lead to the creation of alternative 
blockchains known as forks (Andersen & Ingram 
Bogusz, 2019; Decker & Wattenhofer, 2013). 
Consensus protocols address the issue by specifying 
how the right to validate new transactions (which are 
stored in batches called blocks—hence the name 
“blockchain”) is assigned. They do so by defining the 
basic rules that distribute decision-making power 
 
3 Beyond negotiations of agents directly mediated by the 
consensus protocol, agents also negotiate and constantly 
among human agents. For instance, in the proof-of-
work consensus protocol used by Bitcoin, decision-
making power is distributed proportionally to the 
expenditure of computational power without external 
utility (i.e., mining). The agent with the most 
decision-making power is most likely to accrue the 
right to add a new block to the blockchain. 
Randomization in the consensus protocol ensures that 
the agent with the most decision-making power does 
not acquire the right to validate every block, which is 
crucial since a high degree of centralization of 
decision-making power threatens the blockchain’s 
integrity (Bano et al., 2017; Tschorsch & 
Scheuermann, 2017).  
What is important for IS research is that in this context 
the actions of human agents exert a powerful influence 
on the blockchain. 3  Mediated by the protocol, the 
agents most often achieve consensus, but their 
behavior can also induce forks—both incidentally and 
deliberately. These forks can have different 
renegotiate the blockchain protocol in other social spaces 
such as online forums or in physical meetings. 
 
Figure 1. Framework for Blockchain Research in Information Systems 
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consequences, such as the creation of alternative 
histories of transactions (typically the case with 
incidental forks), changes to the blockchain protocol, 
or both (typically the case with deliberate forks) 
(Andersen & Ingram Bogusz, 2019). In addition to 
inducing forks, agent behavior can also actively 
undermine the blockchain’s integrity—for instance, if 
one agent seeking to undermine the blockchain were 
to obtain the majority of decision-making power in the 
consensus protocol. In blockchains with proof-of-
work as a consensus mechanism, for example, this 
would be possible if the agent possessed more than 
half of the computing power used to mine new blocks 
(Nakamoto, 2008). Another aspect is that the presence 
of agents is needed to run and secure the blockchain—
if agents willing to participate in the consensus 
protocol are absent, transactions cannot be added to 
the blockchain and the blockchain’s integrity is 
compromised. Clearly, issues of governance, as well 
as agents’ motives and incentives, are critical for the 
blockchain protocol level. Given the socio-material 
nature of these themes, we believe IS research is a 
natural fit for the area. First IS research of this kind is 
emerging only recently. For instance, Qin, Yuan, and 
Wang (2019) study reward mechanisms in proof-of-
work mining pools. 
2.2 Interactions between Blockchain 
Protocol Level and Blockchain 
Application Level 
Second, there are important interactions between the 
protocol level and the application level. Different 
blockchain protocols constrain and afford different 
applications and uses (Glaser, 2017). For example, 
private blockchains may be better suited for 
supporting the operations of incumbent players such 
as governments and established companies, given 
their higher degree of centralized control and 
confidentiality. However, not only the blockchain 
protocol itself, but also the imbrication of human 
agents and the blockchain protocol constrains and 
affords applications. For instance, if one agent 
accumulates a lot of decision-making power in the 
consensus protocol, the blockchain’s integrity is at 
stake and any blockchain application is at risk. Vice 
versa, the protocol level is shaped by the application 
level, as concerns about applicability or developments 
at the application level lead to changes at the protocol 
level. These changes can either take the form of 
modifications of human agent behavior or 
modifications to the blockchain protocol. There are 
examples for both instances: For the former, high 
demand for Bitcoin and, therefore, high prices 
 
4 https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoins-price-surge-is-
making-hobby-mining-profitable-again 
incentivized agents to participate in the consensus 
protocol to earn mining rewards. 4  For the latter, 
concerns about limited throughput led to several 
Bitcoin forks, where groups of developers set up 
alternatives to Bitcoin by changing the Bitcoin 
protocol to allow for increased scalability (Andersen 
& Ingram Bogusz, 2019). Overall, refocusing IS 
blockchain research on the interactions between the 
protocol level and the application level might allow 
for a richer understanding of the blockchain 
phenomenon. For example, a recent paper (Pedersen, 
Risius, & Beck, 2019) discusses not only in which 
application contexts it makes sense to use a 
blockchain, but also clarifies which blockchain to use 
in which context. 
2.3 The Blockchain Application Level 
Most IS research on blockchain has thus far focused 
on the application level, which concerns how 
blockchain can be applied to business problems or 
societal issues. Many proposed blockchain 
applications are based on the idea of using smart 
contracts, which are not unique to blockchain 
(Halaburda, 2018). At the same time, many believe 
that smart contracts, when paired with blockchain, 
may be particularly beneficial, by leading to outcomes 
such as disintermediation (Clemons et al., 2017). The 
other salient application area of blockchain is 
cryptocurrencies. It should be noted that 
cryptocurrencies play a role both at the protocol level 
and the application level, depending on the context. 
For instance, cryptocurrencies are a protocol-level 
issue if the focus lies on analyzing how they 
incentivize agents’ participation in the consensus 
protocol. However, cryptocurrencies can also be an 
application-level concern; for instance, if one is 
concerned with whether users perceive them as a 
currency or as an asset.5 Another important aspect is 
that the application level is socio-material, akin to the 
protocol level, since at the application level we find a 
range of technological artifacts (e.g., smart contracts) 
embedded in a social context. However, the focus of 
our framework lies on the protocol level and its 
interactions with the application level and, therefore, 
the framework does not further elaborate on the 
application level. 
Nevertheless, research on blockchain applications is 
indeed important—in particular, for understanding the 
consequences of blockchain’s use. Claims that the 
advent of blockchain and blockchain-based smart 
contracts may have substantial implications for trust 
(Beck, Czepluch, Lollike, & Malone, 2016), 
transaction costs, and intermediaries (Catalini & 
5  Glaser, Zimmermann, Haferkorn, Weber, and Siering 
(2014) investigate whether users perceive Bitcoin as a 
currency or as an investment vehicle.  
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Gans, 2016; Clemons et al., 2017; Iansiti & Lakhani, 
2017) can be empirically assessed in application 
contexts. Even though IS blockchain research 
concerning the application level is published more 
frequently than research on the protocol level, there is 
still a need for more theory-driven and empirically 
rigorous work on the application level. Our argument 
is, therefore, not to shift the focus of IS research on 
blockchain away from the application level, but to go 
beyond the applications by also considering the 
protocol level, as well as interactions between the 
levels. Thus, this editorial offers a research agenda for 
blockchain research in IS that accounts for these areas. 
Our research agenda is inclusive, spanning the three 
main paradigms in IS research (behavioral, design, 
economics), all of which can make valuable and 
important contributions to further our understanding 
of blockchain. In the next chapter, we will provide a 
brief discussion of critical issues at the protocol level 
to serve as important cornerstones for our research 
agenda. 
3 Critical Issues at the Blockchain 
Protocol Level and Their 
Interactions with the Blockchain 
Application Level 
Our framework suggests several opportunities for 
future blockchain research within IS that take the 
protocol level into account, either by focusing on the 
protocol level exclusively or by considering the 
interactions between the protocol level and 
application level. In particular, we direct the attention 
of IS researchers toward issues of information 
privacy, scalability, security, and environmental 
sustainability. All of these are important because they 
exert affordances and constraints on blockchain 
applications, and are also shaped by concerns at the 
application level. In particular, issues of information 
privacy, security, and environmental sustainability are 
also inherently sociomaterial, which makes them 
potential IS research areas, even if concrete 
application scenarios are not taken into account.  
Information privacy refers to the ability to control how 
an individual’s personal information is acquired and 
used (Westin, 1967). Such concerns arise since, in 
most blockchains, transactions are not anonymous but 
pseudonymous. Transactions can be traced back to 
their initiator and recipient, who can be identified 
through their public addresses. Previous research has 
shown that users are often not aware of the issue 
(Fabian, Ermakova, & Sander, 2016), even though it 
has been demonstrated that it may be possible to 
reveal users’ real-world identities (Meiklejohn et al., 
 
6 https://cointelegraph.com/bitcoin-cash-for-
beginners/what-is-bitcoin-cash#story-of-the-hard-fork 
2013; Reid & Harrigan, 2013; Yin et al., 2019). To 
address the issue, anonymous blockchains such as 
Monero obfuscate their users’ identities (Kumar, 
Fischer, Tople, & Saxena, 2017). However, such 
blockchains are often used for criminal purposes such 
as ransomware attacks and transactions on darknet 
marketplaces. Moreover, their privacy-preserving 
mechanisms can be compromised, even though 
countermeasures have been proposed (Möser et al., 
2018). 
Scalability refers to the number of transactions a 
blockchain can process within a given time. It is 
another major concern when blockchains are used. A 
number of ways to address the issue have been 
suggested (Croman et al., 2016). One way to foster 
blockchain scalability is to conduct transactions off-
chain. It is, however, likely that the resulting 
performance improvements are also associated with 
increased centralization, and it is unclear if protocols 
conducting transactions off-chain can outperform 
blockchains such as Bitcoin’s overall (Croman et al., 
2016). Another often proposed approach to promoting 
scalability is to increase the block size so that blocks 
can contain a higher number of transactions. 
However, increasing block size may increase the 
number of forks and the possibilities for double-
spending attacks (Karame, Androulaki, Roeschlin, 
Gervais, & Čapkun, 2015; Vukolic, 2015). Moreover, 
similar to conducting transactions off-chain, there are 
concerns that increasing block size might foster 
centralization in the consensus protocol. 6  The 
example of Steemit, a blockchain-based social 
network, illustrates how decentralization is sacrificed 
for scalability (Ciriello et al., 2018).  
Such a trade-off may impede security since the 
blockchain’s integrity, and thus its tamper-resistance, 
is contingent on decentralization of decision-making 
power in the consensus protocol (as discussed in 
Section 2.1). Agents with a high degree of decision-
making power in the consensus protocol could attack 
the blockchain by double-spending cryptocurrency, 
effectively spending more than they own (Gervais et 
al., 2016). However, attacks on consensus protocols 
do not necessarily have to be motivated by profit. 
Such Goldfinger attacks can be motivated by political 
or social aims (Kroll, Davey, & Felten, 2013). 
Strategies for obtaining decision-making power in 
consensus protocols can also vary. For instance, given 
that computing power does not have to be bought but 
can also be rented, it might be less costly to 
compromise blockchains relying on proof-of-work 
consensus protocols than is often assumed (Bonneau, 
2018). Besides matters of centralization in the 
consensus protocol, other security issues are also 
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important. For example, distributed denial-of-service 
(DDoS) attacks occur frequently (Vasek, Thornton, & 
Moore, 2014). Blockchain-based smart contracts are 
also affected by security issues—in particular, given 
that coding errors could have major consequences 
(Beck et al., 2018).  
Consensus protocols are also of importance due to 
issues of environmental sustainability. 7 Proof-of-
work, still the most prominent consensus mechanism, 
assigns the right to add a new block to the blockchain 
based on the expenditure of computing power 
(Nakamoto, 2008). In practice, this has led to an arms 
race with ever-expanding energy consumption. 
Alternative consensus mechanisms, including proof-
of-stake and delegated proof-of-stake, address these 
concerns. Proof-of-stake averts the issue by assigning 
the right to validate a new block based on the amount 
of cryptocurrency (the “stake”) an agent owns (King 
& Nadal, 2012). In delegated proof-of-stake, a 
consensus mechanism for permissioned blockchains 
(see also Table 1), stakeholders elect delegates—
which are expected to behave nonmaliciously—to 
validate new blocks (Zheng, Xie, Dai, Chen, & Wang, 
2017). While these alternatives to proof-of-work are 
becoming more prominent, they may not be as secure. 
For instance, the “nothing-at-stake” problem could 
impede consensus, given that there is no opportunity 
cost for adding new blocks to every potential fork 
(Bano et al., 2017). However, recent research suggests 
a key assumption underlying the notion of the 
“nothing-at-stake” problem may not hold (Saleh, 
2018). Moreover, ways to address the problem are 
being devised, and major blockchains such as 
Ethereum plan to migrate from proof-of-work to 
proof-of-stake in the future (Buterin & Griffith, 2017). 
A review of applications in practice illustrates trade-
offs are indeed occurring between scalability, 
security, and environmental sustainability. For 
instance, Bitcoin appears to be rather secure, but it is 
neither scalable nor environmentally sustainable, with 
a maximum transaction processing capacity range 
estimated at between 3.3 and 7 transactions per second 
(Croman et al., 2016) and an energy consumption that 
may rival Denmark’s.8  
Since the socio-material nature of the issues identified 
at the protocol level aligns with our discipline’s focus 
on socio-material phenomena, we believe that IS 
research could contribute to studying these important 
trade-offs. Moreover, a better understanding of the 
interplay between blockchain applications and 
blockchain protocol is needed, given that issues of 
privacy, scalability, security, and environmental 
sustainability exert constraints on how blockchains 
can be used for applications. Vice versa, decisions 
about design trade-offs at the protocol level are 
contingent on the applications the respective 
blockchain is used for. For example, it has been 
argued that in the case of Steemit, which relies on 
delegated proof-of-stake, it may be acceptable to 
compromise security for scalability, since most value 
transfers are microtransactions.9 In the next section, 
we provide concrete ways for IS researchers from the 
discipline’s three major paradigms to address such 
concerns, in addition to other issues that are 
exclusively situated at the protocol level or 
application level. 
4 An Agenda for Blockchain 
Research in Information Systems 
The advent of blockchain opens up intriguing 
opportunities for research within and across the 
blockchain protocol and application levels. New 
theories are needed to address all kinds of important 
questions blockchain gives rise to. To lay the 
foundations for theory development, new frameworks 
are necessary to understand key concerns of IS 
research on blockchain. Such work would support the 
development of theories that further our 
understanding of blockchain as well as its impacts. 
Rigorous empirical research is needed to test these 
novel theories and to test existing theories that should 
be revisited in light of blockchain. In the following 
subsections, we articulate a cross-cutting future IS 
research agenda on blockchain that directs attention 
toward opportunities for research on blockchain 
situated in the behavioral, design, and economics 
research paradigms. 
 
7 In this discussion, we focus on negative environmental 
impacts of blockchain. It has been argued that blockchain 
may be useful to foster environmental sustainability 
(Chapron 2017). This is, however, not a primary issue for 
the blockchain protocol level, but for the application level. 
8 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/ 
2018/02/13/cryptocurrency-mining-in-iceland-is-using-so-
much-energy-the-electricity-may-run-
out/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bd1b0026be6b 
9 https://medium.com/loom-network/scalability-tradeoffs-
why-the-ethereum-killer-hasnt-arrived-yet-8f60a88e46c0 
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Table 2. Agenda for Behavioral IS Research on Blockchain 
Blockchain level Possible areas of inquiry 
Protocol level • What is the role of trust that individuals place in the blockchain system?  
• How can we explain actors’ propensity to pursue Goldfinger attacks? 
• What motivates actors to participate in transaction validation? 
• How are forks in the blockchain protocol initiated at the social level? 
• What are the mechanisms of the interplay between consensus at the social 
level and in the blockchain protocol? 
• How are blockchain-based decentralized autonomous organizations 
governed? 
• How are decision rights allocated? 
• What are the forces that drive (de)centralization of decision rights? 
• Is blockchain changing how accountability is enacted? 
Interactions between protocol level and 
application level 
• How do concerns about applicability shape how the blockchain protocol is 
negotiated? 
• How can application users actualize blockchain’s affordances? 
• How do constraints imposed by the blockchain protocol affect user 
behavior? 
• How do application users change their behavior in the light of openly 
available (albeit pseudonymous) data trails in public blockchains? 
• How does user behavior vary between blockchains that enable 
pseudonymous transactions versus blockchains that enable anonymous 
transactions? 
• How do concerns about security impact user behavior? 
Application level • How does the use of blockchain affect actors’ behavior in the light of de 
facto immutability of data? 
• How can we explain blockchain adoption? 
4.1 A Blockchain Research Agenda for 
Behavioral Information Systems 
Research 
Behavioral (individual, group, and organizational) IS 
research on blockchain has the capacity to make 
contributions across all levels of our framework (see 
Table 2). At the protocol level, the advent of 
blockchain raises issues of trust. While it has been 
argued that blockchains reduce the need for trust, it 
seems likely that at the protocol level, actors using the 
blockchain for applications need to trust both the 
algorithms that make up the actual blockchain 
protocol as well as the agents managing the network. 
The protocol itself may contain bugs which even 
expert developers might fail to detect, whereas the 
agents may have malicious intent. However, the role 
of trust that individuals place in the blockchain is still 
little understood, and research studying the issue of 
trust in blockchain is much needed. Such research is 
linked to issues of security. Typically, it is assumed 
that agents attacking the blockchain’s integrity are 
profit seeking, but the motives agents may have for 
attempting Goldfinger attacks are little understood 
(see also Bonneau, 2018). Similarly, it is mostly 
assumed that agents participating in transaction 
validation are motivated by profit. However, other 
motives may also play a role. Understanding these 
factors might be useful for ultimately designing 
blockchain protocols that are made more secure by 
ensuring incentive alignment. At the protocol level, 
governance issues are particularly interesting (see 
Beck et al., 2018, for a blockchain governance 
framework and research agenda). Even though many 
expect blockchain-based organizations known as 
decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) to 
change organizational governance by decentralizing 
decision rights, these changes have only partly 
materialized (Beck et al., 2018). However, in the case 
of consensus protocols, it is already apparent that 
governance has become decentralized or at least 
decentralizable (Andersen & Ingram Bogusz, 2019; 
Beck et al., 2018; Halaburda & Mueller-Bloch, 2019; 
Hsieh, Vergne, Anderson, Lakhani, & Reitzig, 2018). 
We believe more empirical research is needed to 
reveal how decentralized blockchains really are at this 
point and to study the forces that affect the degree of 
decentralization. This pertains, in particular, to 
decisions directly mediated by the consensus protocol, 
which concern both the transactions added to the 
blockchain and the blockchain protocol itself. For 
instance, Bitcoin is notorious for its centralized 
consensus protocol, which poses a substantial risk to 
the integrity of its blockchain and also controverts its 
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ideology of decentralization. 10  The distribution of 
decision rights in the social world—for instance, at 
conferences, online forums, or within groups of 
blockchain developers—should also be studied 
further, given the hope that decision rights will be 
widely decentralized. Another important issue is 
accountability. Blockchain-based smart contracts may 
enact accountability technologically instead of 
institutionally (Beck et al., 2018), but more empirical 
research is needed to follow up on how the initial 
promises materialize in practice. 
Behavioral IS research can also contribute to a better 
understanding of the interactions between the 
blockchain protocol level and application level. 
Again, governance issues are of importance here. 
Many decisions about the blockchain protocol are 
shaped by concerns about applicability, as the case of 
Bitcoin illustrates (Andersen & Ingram Bogusz, 
2019), but more empirical research is needed to study 
how these decisions are negotiated and eventually 
made. Another important question is how those using 
blockchain actualize its affordances. Initial research is 
emerging, but the replication required for different 
contexts and statistical validation is still lacking (Du, 
Pan, Leidner, & Ying, 2018). In addition, more 
research is needed to study how constraints imposed 
by the blockchain protocol affect the behavior of 
individual application users. In this context, privacy is 
an important issue. For public blockchains, users’ will 
leave openly available data trails, and more research 
is needed to understand how this affects their 
behavior. In particular, changes could be expected for 
pseudonymous (as opposed to anonymous) 
blockchains. Another promising direction for future 
research would be to focus on how individual 
behavior varies between blockchains that enable 
pseudonymous transactions versus those that enable 
anonymous transactions. Overall, a more refined 
understanding of privacy issues is much needed and,  
similarly, more research is needed to better understand 
and explain issues associated with security, given that 
concerns about security are likely to shape user 
behavior.  
At the application level, interesting questions emerge 
about how individual behavior changes in light of de 
facto immutable data (note that this is different from 
openly available data). While individuals are likely to 
become more cautious, IS research is needed to better 
understand how de facto immutable data affect user 
willingness to engage in transactions on the 
blockchain. Another important issue is blockchain 
adoption. Many promising blockchain applications 
have been proposed, but widespread adoption is rare 
(Iansiti & Lakhani, 2017). Future IS research could 
study the antecedents of blockchain adoption and thus 
contribute to addressing the adoption issue. We 
believe regulatory concerns may play an important 
role, but other factors such as protocol issues (in 
particular, privacy, security, and scalability) are likely 
also important. Research on this topic could attempt 
to reveal these factors, thereby contributing not only 
academically but also informing practice.  
Table 3. Agenda for Design Science Research on Blockchain 
Blockchain level Possible areas of inquiry 
Protocol level • How can IS research contribute to designing more environmentally 
sustainable yet secure consensus protocols? 
• What are promising methods for designing consensus protocols? 
Interactions between protocol level and 
application level 
• What are the implications of blockchain protocol design choices for 
blockchain applications? 
• What are promising application areas for blockchain and what are the 
implications for protocol design in terms of design requirements? 
• Are the design assumptions behind new transaction platforms sound? 
• Can we understand and mitigate unintended side effects of new 
blockchain implementations? 
Application level • How can we mitigate the risk of coding errors in blockchain-based smart 
contracts? 
• How can we ensure that oracles provide correct information? 
• What kinds of issues arise when oracles (e.g., sensors and other IoT 
devices) feed blockchains? 
 
10 https://www.ccn.com/bitmains-mining-pools-now-
control-nearly-51-percent-of-the-bitcoin-hashrate 
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4.2 A Blockchain Research Agenda for 
Design Science Research 
Blockchain also creates opportunities for IS 
researchers focusing on design aspects, which cut 
across all levels of our research framework (see Table 
3). At the protocol level, the key concern is the security 
of consensus protocols, as well as associated trade-offs 
with scalability and environmental sustainability. In 
their current form, consensus protocols such as proof-
of-work or proof-of-stake suffer from severe 
drawbacks. Design-oriented IS research could  address 
these issues. Thus far, design-oriented research in this 
area has mainly come from computer science, but we 
believe that design science researchers within IS could 
make valuable contributions as well. They could 
design and evaluate alternative consensus protocols 
that are not only technically viable, but also strongly 
focused on human aspects. For instance, such design 
research could incorporate insights from IS economics 
research regarding agents’ incentives and insights from 
behavioral IS research concerning agents’ behavior 
beyond utility maximization. Both may be critical in 
ensuring the security of consensus protocols, and 
design-oriented IS research is well poised to study 
them. Related to such research, IS design researchers 
could also contribute by developing methods for 
designing consensus protocols that take human 
motives into account. 
In terms of the interactions between protocol level and 
application level, several important issues can be 
addressed by design-oriented IS research. More studies 
are needed to better understand the implications of 
different protocol design choices for blockchain 
applications. Some have argued that blockchain is a 
solution in search for a problem11. To address these 
concerns, another approach to identify promising 
application areas could be to start with a problem, by 
reflecting upon salient business challenges and 
important societal issues. Only after identifying such a 
problem, the researcher would identify the constraints 
exerted by the protocol level and propose designs 
addressing them. As blockchain affects established 
patterns of user behavior in sensitive areas—such as 
changing ownership of goods and monetary 
transactions—it is important to conduct trials in 
different kinds of settings and with different 
prototypes. This would naturally lead into using design 
research (e.g., Action Design Research) that promotes 
testing designs in real-world settings and evolving the 
 
11 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbloomberg/2017/05/31/e
ight-reasons-to-be-skeptical-about-blockchain/ 
artifacts during their testing (Lindman, Rossi, and 
Tuunainen 2017).  Different blockchains such as 
Ethereum, Hyperledger, and others, afford different 
things and thus restrict the choices of application 
developers and the use cases available. These 
affordances and constraints are crucial for third parties 
that implement new services on top of the blockchain 
protocol level. Critical analysis and evaluations of 
these platforms should result in design principles and 
design theories for future blockchain applications. For 
example, overly naive assumptions about the behavior 
of different stakeholders can lead to security issues or 
bad governance, as in the case of the Quadriga 
exchange founder’s death and the disappearing of 
nearly all of clients’ deposits, which will erode the trust 
in the blockchain infrastructures12. 
At the application level, a promising research area is 
the design of blockchain-based smart contracts. Smart 
contracts carry great potential but have thus far failed 
to live up to these promises. A major reason may be 
that blockchain-based smart contracts’ advantages 
come at a substantial cost. If smart contracts are de 
facto immutable and autonomously executed, coding 
errors can lead to major consequences (Beck et al., 
2018). Therefore, research is needed to design 
mechanisms that mitigate this risk and study how smart 
contract design can avoid logical errors and software 
bugs in the first place. Another important issue that 
design-oriented IS research should address is 
blockchain oracles. Oracles are needed when a smart 
contract stipulates that the execution of a transaction 
depends on a real-world occurrence. In such cases, 
oracles feed the information (stemming from either the 
digital or the physical realm—sensor data in the latter 
case) regarding the conditional event onto the 
blockchain (Xu et al., 2016). This can, however, be a 
problem, given that the information may be fraudulent 
or simply incorrect. Initial research proposing ways to 
address the problem is emerging (e.g., Chanson, 
Bogner, Bilgeri, Fleisch, & Wortmann in this special 
issue), but more studies are needed to further design 
and evaluate artifacts that can mitigate the issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
12 https://www.npr.org/2019/03/06/700651500/crypto-
mystery-quadrigas-wallets-are-empty-putting-fate-of-137-
million-in-doubt 
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Table 4. Agenda for Economics of IS Research on Blockchain 
Blockchain level Possible areas of inquiry 
Protocol level • How can we explain agent behavior in consensus protocols? 
• What are security issues and associated tradeoffs in consensus protocols? 
Interactions between protocol level and 
application level 
• How do different blockchain protocols create different logics of value 
creation and value capture? 
• How do changes on the blockchain protocol level affect cryptocurrency 
prices? 
Application level • How does blockchain affect the cost of doing business? 
• How does blockchain affect intermediaries? 
• What are the antecedents, consequences, and boundary conditions of the 
economic changes ascribed to blockchain? 
• What is the role of network effects in blockchains? 
• How do different blockchains compete? 
• What can we learn about initial coin offerings (ICOs)? 
4.3 A Blockchain Research Agenda for 
the Economics of Information 
Systems 
For those studying the economics of IS, the advent of 
blockchain gives rise to multiple fascinating research 
questions across all dimensions of our framework (see 
Table 4). At the protocol level, incentive alignment is 
crucial to ensure secure consensus mechanisms (Beck 
et al., 2018). Future IS research could draw from game 
theory to better understand how incentives structures 
impact agent behavior and thus security in consensus 
mechanisms, as well as associated trade-offs with 
environmental and performance concerns. Research 
along these lines is already emerging: For instance, 
Cong, He, and Li (2018) study centralization and 
decentralization forces in proof-of-work consensus 
mechanisms and argue that risk-sharing drives 
centralization in mining pools. They also present 
evidence consistent with their theoretical argument. 
Saleh (2018) focuses on trade-offs between 
environmental sustainability and security by focusing 
on the viability of the proof-of-stake consensus 
mechanisms as a sustainable alternative to proof-of-
work. The paper introduces a formal economic model 
of proof-of-stake that demonstrates the invalidity of 
the “nothing-at-stake” problem. Overall, more 
research is needed, given that consensus protocols are 
still frequently being undermined.13 
Regarding the interplay of protocol level and 
application level, IS research could investigate how 
different blockchain protocols create different logics of 
value creation and value capture. Initial research on 
this is already emerging (Hua, Chong, Lim, Zheng, and 
 
13 https://cryptoslate.com/ethereum-classics-51-percent-
attack-highlights-challenges-proof-work-coins/ 
Tan in this special issue), but, in particular, the role of 
the blockchain protocol level deserves further 
attention. In particular, it has been argued that 
blockchains are associated with disintermediation, 
however, this most likely depends on the blockchain 
protocol that has been implemented—private 
blockchains are unlikely to be associated with removal 
of trusted third parties.  
At the application level, there are intriguing 
opportunities to study the nature of a blockchain-based 
economy. Such a blockchain economy (Beck et al., 
2018; Berg, Davidson, & Potts, 2017) would rely on 
blockchain—for purposes such as payments or for 
record keeping in general—and possibly blockchain-
based smart contracts as well. It has been argued that 
such an economic system reduces the need for 
intermediaries (e.g., Iansiti & Lakhani, 2017) and 
lowers costs of doing business (e.g., the cost of 
verification and cost of networking) (Catalini & Gans, 
2016). However, more empirical evidence is needed to 
test these hypotheses. Moreover, the theoretical 
arguments need to be refined—in particular, with 
respect to their antecedents and consequences. Another 
concern is the boundary conditions of these emerging 
theories. Even if it can be demonstrated that 
blockchain has effects such as disintermediation, this 
will likely not be the case under all circumstances. 
Blockchain adoption is another important issue 
situated at the application level. Network effects may 
be a decisive factor determining the adoption and 
competition of blockchains. First evidence shows that 
network effects and winner-take-all dynamics drive 
competition between blockchains (Gandal & 
Halaburda, 2016), but more research is needed to 
expand on these findings, particularly regarding how 
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competition evolves over time. Studying the switching 
costs associated with blockchains would be of 
particular interest in this context. Another emerging 
area of research is initial coin offerings (ICOs). For 
instance, Bruckner, Steininger, Veit, and Thatcher 
(2019) analyze what influences investments in ICOs. 
Other research shows that the platform-specific tokens 
issued in ICOs can help to address the coordination 
problem in network adoption (Bakos & Halaburda, 
2018). IS researchers could get more involved in 
understanding and explaining different facets of ICOs, 
and these papers provide a useful starting point for 
research on the topic. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
Besides computer science and cryptography studies, 
blockchain has been predominantly discussed in the 
practitioner literature. Rigorous empirical and theory-
driven IS research on blockchain is emerging 
gradually. Our special issue contributes to this new 
area of inquiry. This editorial reviews and expands on 
existing IS research on blockchain by providing a 
framework for blockchain research in IS that directs 
attention to two important issues: First, the need for IS 
research to consider the blockchain protocol level, 
which is characterized by recursive interactions 
between human agents and the blockchain protocol. 
Second, the lack of IS research that considers how the 
protocol level constrains and affords blockchain 
applications, and how these constraints and other 
issues at the application level lead to changes at the 
protocol level. We propose an inclusive IS research 
agenda that emphasizes the need for behavioral 
(individual, group, and organizational), design science 
and IS economics research on blockchain. IS scholars 
conducting such research can contribute in several 
meaningful ways: by developing a thorough theoretical 
understanding of the blockchain phenomenon, by 
testing these theories through rigorous empirical 
research, and by communicating research findings to 
practice.  
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